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The key story in the 2017 Dutch election campaign so far has been the high levels of support for
Geert Wilders’ PVV in opinion polls. But what explains the PVV’s ability to attract voters? James
Dennison, Andrew Geddes and Teresa Talò write that although Wilders’ success is frequently
linked to hardening views on immigration, attitudes toward immigration in the Netherlands have
actually remained fairly stable. The real root of the PVV’s support lies in the salience of the
immigration issue itself, partially heightened by media coverage of recent increases in the numbers
of migrants entering the country.
2017 has been widely billed as a year of potentially momentous elections across Europe, including
in Germany, France and, on 15 March, in the Netherlands. Some commentators have speculated
about a domino effect that would see mainstream governments fall as part of a pan-Western
backlash against globalisation and high levels of immigration following the British EU referendum
and American presidential election of 2016. At first glance, the Dutch election supports this
interpretation: polls suggest that the anti-immigration PVV – led by Geert Wilders – may win the
most seats of any party in the House of Representatives. If Wilders’ party comes first, should we
interpret the result as another example of surging public demand for an end to immigration? Or are
such election results less indicative of a radical change in public attitudes than has thus far been
assumed?
Figure 1 shows that immigration to the Netherlands and support for the PVV have risen in unison
since 2011. This supports the observation that ‘ethnic change is historically associated with calls for
immigration restrictions’. However, during this period we also see considerable volatility in PVV
support, which was harmed in 2012 by the party’s role in the previous coalition government but then benefitted from
the subsequent coalition between the centre-right VVD and centre-left PvdA.
The PVV enjoyed another boost in the wake of widely covered localised opposition to refugee settlement, an issue
that has ebbed more recently though still sees half of Dutch people  arguing that African migrants should be returned.
Despite this volatility, the correlation between the PVV’s average annual polling and annual immigration to the
Netherlands since 2011 is very strong (r = 0.85; p = 0.03; N = 6), suggestive that the PVV’s success is partially
determined by actual immigration figures.
Figure 1: Immigration to the Netherlands and radical right support
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Wilders claims that Islam is a ‘backward’ religion and that its followers are disproportionately sympathetic to values
that threaten the Dutch way of life – with LGBT and women’s rights often cited as being particularly at risk. Focusing
on Islam has been effective in the Netherlands given its history of immigration, from Indonesia and Suriname as well
as Turkish and Moroccan labour immigrants. Dutch attitudes to these communities vary considerably: the primarily
Christian Indonesian and Suriname communities are generally considered well integrated while Turks and, to a
greater extent, Moroccans are regularly decried for their higher crime rates, weaker economic performance and
supposedly languid integration efforts. From 2004 onwards, the Netherlands has experienced two further new waves
of immigration – first from Poland and, in the last few years, from non-European conflict zones, with 64,000 Syrians
officially residing in the country as of September last year.
Attempts by Wilders to make political capital out of anti-Polish stances – notably via the creation of a website to
report crimes by Eastern Europeans – have been less successful than his anti-Islamic and anti-Syrian rhetoric,
which finds a sympathetic audience amongst the 50% of Netherlanders who see non-Western migrants as a threat
to their way of life.
Indeed, attitudes towards immigration have a distinct bent in the Netherlands because of its strong socially liberal
self-identity. The Netherlands, along with the Nordics, is generally among the most open of European countries. The
Dutch seem to be less concerned than their European counterparts with migrants’ ethnicity, skills and qualifications.
However, there is a notable exception over their concern with safeguarding a liberal, tolerant lifestyle (Figure 2).
They are among the top five European countries in demanding that immigrants learn the native language and adopt
Dutch customs.
Figure 2: ‘How important is it that immigrants have the following traits?’
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Wilders’ uncompromising stance has allowed him to garner the votes of citizens with anti-immigration and anti-
Islamic attitudes and make the PVV the obvious anti-immigration choice when the immigration issue is salient. Prior
to the 2012 election – dominated by a close, economics-driven race between the VVD and PvdA – he could only
watch from the sidelines as the PVV parliamentary representation was cut by a third. Today, the vast majority of
those Dutch voters who plan to back the PVV see immigration and asylum as a motivation for their party choice
(Figure 3). However, between June and December of 2016, the proportion of the population giving immigration and
asylum as a basis for their planned vote declined notably from 41% to 33%, despite over 80% expressing some
concern over immigration. At the same time, Wilders has suffered in the opinion polls.
Figure 3: Motivations for party choice: percentage responding ‘immigration and asylum’
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More broadly, in the Netherlands and all but one other Western European country, average attitudes to immigration
are fairly stable and have actually become more positive throughout the 21st century (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Mean evaluation of whether immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live in in 2002
and 2014 (scale from 0 = worse to 10 = better)
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Source: ESS 2002 and ESS 2014
The gradually more pro-immigration attitudes of Europeans stand in contrast to the rapid rise of populist radical right
parties in some European countries that has coincided with two large waves of immigration. This suggests that
attitudes towards immigration at the aggregate level are not necessarily related to the number of immigrants.
Instead, anti-immigration attitudes are fairly fixed and latent in social conservatives (majorities of CDA, PVV and
50Plus voters – like PVV voters – feel the advent of non-Western immigrants is a threat to Dutch values).
These attitudes are however activated and motivate party choice when the issue is made salient such as in times of
high immigration levels. As such, high immigration has indeed led to the rise of anti-immigration parties in the likes of
the Netherlands, France and Britain, not by turning natives against immigration but by increasing the salience of the
topic amongst those who already view socio-demographic change as a risk to the national social order.
These individuals are disproportionately found amongst lower socio-economic groups who tend towards having
social conservative and left-wing economic attitudes, both of which call for order and eschew ambivalence and
uncertainty. Indeed, the most relevant socio-economic variable in determining sympathy to immigration is having a
university education, which tends to act as a liberalising socialisation experience. The argument that anti-
immigration attitudes are latent and interlinked with other ideological outlooks conforms to the often-repeated
observation that regional immigration levels have no or a negative correlation with regional immigration attitudes, a
finding repeated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Non-EU population and attitudes to immigration by region
Source: Eurostat Census 2011; ESS 2014; foreign-born respondents are excluded from the
computation of averages
The Dutch election shows the nuanced relationship between immigration rates, immigration attitudes, and variance
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in the support of populist radical right parties. Higher immigration rates seem to go hand in hand with the recent
surge in support for the PVV. However, attitudes towards immigration are fairly stable in the general population.
Salience plays a key role in explaining the PVV’s rising performance in the polls: immigration’s salience rises along
with actual waves of immigration and their coverage in the media.
In turn, higher salience mobilises citizens that hold anti-immigration stances to vote for radical right populist parties
such as the PVV. In this case, the potential level of support for parties like the PVV (which currently polls at around
25 seats) is likely to be limited. Just as anti-immigration attitudes were a necessary but insufficient factor in
explaining both Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, anti-immigration sentiment alone will not be enough to
make the Dutch, French and German governments ‘fall like dominos’ in 2017.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image: Amsterdam, Damstraat. Credits: Moyan Brenn (CC BY 2.0).
Corrections: 1) The article previously erroneously stated that 200,000 Syrians entered the Netherlands in 2015. The
figure in fact referred to the total number of migrants. 2) Polling figures refer to seats, not percentages. 
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